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Abstract
The aim of this research was to identify what factors deter explicit intergroup bias in childhood. Two studies were
conducted to examine what facilitates the control of ethnic bias amongst 6–9-year-old majority children. In both studies
in-group accountability was either low (i.e., only accountable to experimenter) or high (i.e., also accountable to
classmates and teachers). Study 1 (n¼ 287) found that only 8–9-year-old with low social emotions reduced their bias with
increased accountability. Study 2 (n¼ 236) showed children with low ‘‘Theory of Social Mind’’ (ToSM: Abrams, Rutland,
Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2009), who perceived an anti-prejudice in-group norm, decreased their bias when accountability
increased. In both studies children high in social emotion and ToSM showed low bias irrespective of accountability.
Together these studies make a novel contribution by showing for the first time affective and social-cognitive factors that
influence how children learn to control explicit bias. Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Especially when inner conflict is present, people put brakes upon their prejudices. They do not act them out—or they
act them out only up to a certain point. Something stops the logical progression somewhere (Allport, 1954: pp. 332)
Allport’s quote shown above suggests that when people experience inner conflict about showing prejudice they may
start to exert control over their attitudes. Writing in the USA during the 1950s Allport described a few examples of such
conflict and people’s attempt to control their ethnic prejudice. In recent times, with the development of a strong anti-racism
norm in the majority of the population (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000), research shows
that most adults are motivated to control their prejudice (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Plant & Devine, 1998). However, we still
know little about the ‘‘something’’ that Allport said helps stop the development of prejudice, especially amongst children
who are known to show explicit ethnic bias at an early age (Aboud, 2003; Clark, Hocevar, & Dembo, 1980; Katz & Kofkin,
1997; Nesdale, 2001, 2004). In this paper we describe two studies that examined affective and social-cognitive factors
important in 6–9-year-old children learning to control their ethnic intergroup bias.
Research on adults shows that majority status group members generally attempt to control their prejudice. For example,
social psychologists have noted a lack of correspondence between controlled (explicit) and automatic prejudice expression
(Devine, 1989; Nosek, 2005; Plant & Devine, 1998). Non-prejudiced individuals are typically motivated to inhibit
automatically activated cultural stereotypes and establish or maintain a non-prejudiced identity (Devine, 1989). Evidence
suggests that these individuals often, following a possible prejudiced response, devote regulatory effort to figure out how to
avoid future prejudiced responses (Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Viols, & Czopp, 2002). Majority group adults are also
known to expend significant effort to control their expression of prejudice during interracial interaction (e.g., Richeson &
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Shelton, 2003). Still other research on adults has reported differences between explicit reports in public versus private as
evidence of the presumed control of prejudice (e.g., Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002; Plant &
Devine, 1998).
While we have increasing evidence that adults control their prejudice, we know less about children’s self-regulatory
efforts. An extensive body of developmental research over the last 60 years has found that ethnic bias is present in ethnic
majority children as young as 4 years of age (e.g., Aboud, 1988; Katz & Kofkin, 1997). After this, these children’s ethnic
bias has been found to peak around 5 years of age and then decline past 7 years of age (e.g., Aboud, 2003; Clark et al.,
1980).
Recent research in developmental psychology suggests children’s prejudice may decline because they learn to control it
when made publically accountable (e.g., Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & Ferrell, 2007; Monteiro, Franc¸a, & Rodrigues,
2009; Rutland, Cameron, Milne, & McGeorge, 2005). For example, Rutland and colleagues showed that increasing
children’s accountability to their peer group, in the sense that their actions are visible and may have to be defended or could
be criticized, promotes 5-16-year-old children’s self-presentational control of their ethnic and national intergroup
attitudes.
However, while we have evidence that children seem to control their prejudice, currently there is a dearth of research
into developmental factors important in children’s learning to control their prejudice. Research in the adult literature has
suggested that social emotions (e.g., guilt, embarrassment, and shame) encourage people to self-regulate their attitudes
(Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, 1993; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993; Monteith et al.,
2002; Zuwerink, Devine, Monteith, & Cook, 1996). For example, Monteith (1993) argued and found that adults learn to
control their prejudiced responses through self-regulation after they realize they have or might respond with greater
prejudice than expected. This process results in the experience of negative self-directed affect (e.g., guilt, embarrassment),
which acts to control prejudice expression.
Social emotions, such as embarrassment, shame, pride, and guilt (Modigliani, 1968, 1971) are known to develop during
middle childhood (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In particular, developmental research shows that the attribution of social
emotions increases substantially between the ages of 5 and 11 years (Bennett, 1989; Bennett, Thompson, Yuill, &
Banerjee, 1998; Bennett & Gillingham, 1991). For example, Bennett, Thompson, Yuill, and Banerjee (1998) showed that
5–7 year olds self-attributed significantly fewer social emotions than 9 year olds in a hypothetical incident involving them
engaging in a rule violation in front of a passive audience (i.e., no overt reaction to the child’s behavior is cited) while being
responsible for another child who is a friend.
A more recent study by Banerjee (2002b; Experiment 2) also found that children’s attribution of embarrassment
increased noticeably between 7 and 8–9 years of age and the attribution of embarrassment was associated with the
identification of self-presentational motives suggesting that development of this social emotion is related to the degree to
which social evaluation issues are salient to a child. This finding is compatible with other research that suggests people
who are prone to frequent and excessive embarrassment tend to be more self-conscious than the average person and are
more concerned about receiving negative evaluation from others (Buss, 1986; Edelman, 1987; Leary & Meadows, 1991;
Miller, 1995).
We will test two age groups of 6–7 and 8–9 years since the above developmental research suggests that between these
ages children begin to develop the self-attribution social emotions such as embarrassment. Research also shows that
around this age children’s explicit ethnic bias begins to decline while their implicit ethnic bias remains constant (Baron &
Banaji, 2006; Rutland et al., 2005) and children become aware of peer or adult norms regarding the expression of
intergroup bias (Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Augoustinos & Rosewarne, 2001). We expect to find that 6–7 year olds on
average will show little evidence of social emotions and therefore, be less inclined to control their intergroup attitudes;
whereas, 8–9 year olds will overall have a higher propensity to show social emotions and thus control their expression of
intergroup bias.
We will measure the self-attribution of social emotions using a task similar to previous developmental research
described above (e.g., Bennett, 1989; Bennett & Gillingham, 1991), but like Bennett et al. (1998; Experiment 2) the
hypothetical scenario involving a rule violation will include the participant being responsible for a younger friend. This
context of having the child taking care of a younger friend when committing a faux pas was included because it
accentuated the potential for social emotions in the situation. The only difference compared to previous research is that our
version will only include the self-story scenario whereby the child commits an embarrassing act and not when the child’s
friend commits the act. The reasoning for inclusion of the self-story only is that children’s feelings of blame for the friend
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committing the act were only shown in 9–11-year-old children (Bennett et al., 1998). The important matter here is that
using this task allows us to determinewhether the participant also attributes social emotions to this young friend (i.e., other
attribution).
We contend that the self-attribution of social emotions suggests children have social evaluation concerns. Moreover, if
children also experience social emotions on behalf of a friend they should be able for example, to appreciate the feelings
other people close to them (e.g., in-group classmates and teachers) might have if they contravene an in-group norm about
the inappropriateness of expressing ethnic intergroup bias. Hence, older children (i.e., above 8 years) with a higher on
average propensity to show self and other-attribution of social emotions should demonstrate more control of their explicit
ethnic attitudes than younger children (i.e., below 8 years).
This study will examine the control of children’s intergroup attitudes by manipulating public accountability by using a
similar technique to that utilized by Abrams et al. (2007), whereby children were told their answer’s would be shown to
other children from their in-group. In this study to increase the strength of public accountability children will be informed
that both in-group classmates and teachers will see their answers to an explicit ethnic attitude measure. However,
importantly, there will still be some public accountability in the control condition since an experimenter will be present
during testing.
We expect children 8 years and above with a lower individual propensity to attribution self and other social emotions
will not easily appreciate the feelings of the in-group. They will need to rely on social cues (i.e., high public accountability)
to facilitate self and other attribution of social emotions and the control of ethnic intergroup bias. Therefore, these older
children’s intergroup attitudes will be affected by the public accountability manipulation and they will decrease their bias
in the experimental compared to the control condition. In contrast, older children with an high individual propensity to
show social emotions should show an immediate interruption in their ongoing behavior and prospective reflection which




287White British children (153males and 134 females) aged 6–9 years of agewere selected from ethnically homogeneous
primary schools in a suburb of London. The schools’ ethnic composition reflected the ethnic diversity of this London
suburb (Census 2001, Office for National Statistics); with 91.5%White British children, 2.91% Black African/Caribbean-
British children and 5.59% from other ethnic minorities (e.g., Asian-British, Chinese-British, mixed ethnicity). All the
teachers in the schools were White British. There were two age groups of children; one hundred and thirty 6–7 year olds
(M¼ 6 years and 5months, SD¼ 5months) and a hundred and fifty seven 8–9 year olds (M¼ 8 years and 5months, SD¼ 5
months).
Procedure
Children were tested individually in their schools. First they completed a modified version of the social emotion task
(Bennett et al., 1998). Following this they completed an explicit ethnic intergroup attitude task (Aboud, 2003; Doyle &
Aboud, 1995) whilst they were either under low or high public accountability. Boys and girls in each age group were
randomly assigned to either the low or high public accountability condition. Public accountability was manipulated using a
similar technique to that employed by Abrams et al. (2007). In the high public self-focus condition (n¼ 144, 50.2%)
children were told that their ethnic in-group classmates and teachers would see their answers to the explicit intergroup
attitude task. In the low public self-focus condition (n¼ 143, 49.8%) children were told that their answers on this task
would not be shown to their ethnic in-group classmates and teachers. Immediately after the children had completed all the
measures they were debriefed and given a parental debrief form to ensure them that although they had been told their
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Children were presented with two hypothetical vignettes similar to those used by Bennett et al. (1998) and in these stories
the child themselves was cast as the central character. In each vignette, they were described as committing a faux pas in
a public setting. There were two story contexts (supermarket and bus stop). For instance the bus-stop context story;
‘‘Imagine you’re out shopping in the supermarket with your mum and with a little 2-year-old friend called Jo. Your mum
needs to fetch some bread, so she says to you, ‘‘Please look after little Jo for a minute. Make sure that Jo behaves. Do you
think you could do that?’’ So Mum goes off to get the bread, and you wait with Jo next to the tins of baked beans. You’re
holding Jo’s hand, when suddenly, you knock over thewhole pile of baked beans tins [CRASH!]. The bean tins roll all over
the floor, and all the people in the shop are looking at you. They all saw what happened.’’
Each child heard both contexts and the order of presentation was counter-balanced. Each story was accompanied by
two colored pictures, the first showing their mother asking the child to look after the toddler and the second showing the
negative event with onlookers.
Children were asked the following questions (the same in both story contexts): (a) ‘‘Now remember, you were supposed
to be looking after little Jo. How would you feel about what happened? Why? (Anything else?); (b) ‘‘How would little Jo
feel about what happened? Why?’’
Scoring of Social Emotions
Children’s answers to questions (a) and (b) were coded as either showing social emotions or not (i.e., 1¼ social emotions
attributed or 0¼ no social emotions attributed). The social emotions included in the children’s answers were
embarrassment, guilt, or shame. Nearly all social emotion responses included the word embarrassed, though on some
occasions, clear paraphrases were accepted: ‘‘I’d feel silly because everyone is staring at me.’’ Some other children said
they would feel silly or stupid, but as they did not refer to the scrutiny of others, these were coded as zero.
The answers to questions (a) and (b) were then added together separately for both contexts (supermarket and bus stop)
to produce a score ranging from 0 to 2. These scores were positively correlated for bus and supermarket contexts (r¼ . 21,
p< .01) and thus were added together and averaged to produce one final ‘social emotions’ score. For ease of analysis, a
threshold split of> 0 was used on the social emotion scores so that children who did not attribute social emotions had
scores below this threshold (N¼ 142, 49.5%) and children who did social emotions had scores above this threshold
(N¼ 145, 50.5%).
One tenth of all responses, randomly selected from each age group, were double-coded by an independent judge. Inter-
rater agreement exceeded 81% in all cases demonstrating satisfactory inter-rater reliability.
Explicit Ethnic Attitudes
The Multiple-Response Racial Attitude measure (MRA; Aboud, 2003; Doyle & Aboud, 1995) was used to derive the
children’s ethnic intergroup bias. The children were presented with 20 traits (10 positive and 10 negative) taken from
the Preschool Racial Attitude Measure II (Pram II) Series A (Williams, Best, Boswell, Mattson, & Graves, 1975). These
were the same traits as used successfully by Rutland et al. (2005) who also tested children aged 6 years and above and
required the participants to evaluate children. The positive traits were: clean, wonderful, healthy, good, nice, happy,
friendly, helpful, kind, and smart. The negative traits were: unfriendly, mean, dirty, cruel, stupid, selfish, sick, naughty, sad,
and bad.
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Children were presented with one copy of each trait on card and asked to place them in four cups showing either a photo
of a Black child, a White child, both a Black and aWhite child or a blank cup. The children were explicitly told they could
put the card in the ‘Black’ cup, the ‘White’ cup, the ‘Both’ cup (i.e., both ‘Black’ and ‘White’) or in the ‘Blank’ cup. They
were also told the later response meant that they did not think the word described either child. To ensure children
understood the meaning of each word, they were given a corresponding definition. To ensure understanding of the task,
initially each child was asked to practice assigning traits by attributing four non-evaluative items to each of the categories
(Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996). These items were ‘likes to run’, ‘likes to sing’, ‘likes TV’, and ‘likes music’.
The number of traits assigned to the Black child andWhite child was computed. Four scores were calculated; a positive
and a negative trait score for each ethnic group, each with a possible range of 0–10. The higher the scores on positive traits
and the higher the scores on negative traits the more positive and negative the child’s ratings, respectively. Then a positive
bias score was derived by subtracting the out-group positive trait score from the in-group positive trait score; and a
negative bias score was derived by subtracting the in-group negative trait score from the out-group negative trait score.
Finally the positive bias score was added to the negative bias score and divided by 2 to give an intergroup bias score, the
higher this score meant the more ethnic intergroup bias shown.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The correlations between all variables are shown in Table 1. A x2 test of independence was performed to examine the
relation between children’s social emotions and age group. There was a significant association between age and social
emotions x2(4, N¼ 287)¼ 15.85, p< .01. As can be seen from Table 2, children increased their self-attribution of social
emotions with age so that a significantly higher percentage of 8–9-year-old showed social emotions (58.6%, n¼ 92) than
did 6–7 year olds (40.8%, n¼ 53).
Children’s explicit ethnic intergroup attitude scores were submitted to a 2 (Age) 2 (Public accountability) 2 (Social
emotion level; high and low) between participants ANOVAs. As expected we found a significant three way interaction
between Social emotions, Public accountability and Age, F(1, 279)¼ 3.83, p< .05, h2¼ .02. The sample was then split by
age group and there was a significant interaction between Public accountability and Social emotions for 8–9 year olds F(1,
279)¼ 4.08, p< .05, h2¼ .03 but not for 6–7 year olds F (1, 279)¼ .67, p> .05. (see Figure 1a, b). Simple main effects
Table 1. Correlations, means, and standard deviations for age, social emotions, and explicit intergroup bias
1 2 3
1. Age —
2. Social emotions .17 —
3. Intergroup bias .08 .01 —
4. Means 7.60 2.60 0.21
5. SDs 1.09 0.88 2.22
p< .05.
Table 2. Percentage of 6–7 and 8–9 year olds showing social emotions
Age groups
6–7 years 8–9 year olds
No social emotions 59.2% 41.4%
n¼ 77 n¼ 65
Social emotions 40.8% 58.6%
n¼ 53 n¼ 92
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analysis showed that amongst the 8–9-year-old children who did not show social emotions there was a marginally
significant effect of Public accountability on intergroup bias, t(63)¼ 1.88, p¼ .06. This is shown in Figure 1b. It is clear
from this figure that 8–9-year-old children who did not show social emotions reduced their intergroup bias between the low
public accountability condition (M¼ 0.09, SD¼ 1.45) and the high public focus condition (M¼0.89, SD¼ 2.44). In
contrast, it is also evident from Figure 1b that intergroup bias amongst the 8–9-year-old children with a high propensity to
show social emotion level was not affected by the public accountability manipulation, t (90)¼.97, p> .76.
These findings suggest that social emotions moderate older majority status children’s developing ability to control their
expression of explicit ethnic intergroup bias. The intergroup attitudes of the younger children, who overall showed little
tendency to attribute social emotions to the self and others, were as expected unaffected by our public accountability
manipulation. Also as predicted our findings suggest that 8–9-year-old children with a higher individual propensity to
attribute social emotions, where unaffected by the public accountability manipulation. In contrast, 8–9 year olds with a low
individual propensity to show social emotions controlled their ethnic intergroup bias when public accountability was
increased. Arguably these children did not establish under low accountability that they and their in-group would feel social
emotions (e.g., embarrassment) when answering an explicit ethnic bias measure and only did so when made highly
accountable to their ingroup.
These findings appear convergent with the adult literature on prejudice control which shows that the main difference
between low and high prejudiced individuals is the ability to control prejudice (Devine, 1989). It is also convergent with
research (Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002) which indicates that social emotions (e.g., guilt, embarrassment) serve as
warning signals to facilitate the control of prejudice. Study 1 suggests that the attribution of social emotions is an important
Figure 1. (a) The effect of public accountability on high and low social emotion 6–7-year-old children’s intergroup bias. (b) The effect
of public accountability on high and low social emotion 8–9-year-old children’s intergroup bias. Note: 1p> .76 2p¼ .06
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factor in children’s developing ability to control of their explicit ethnic intergroup attitudes (Nesdale, Durkin, Maass, &
Griffiths, 2005; Rutland, 2004; Rutland et al., 2005; Rutland, Brown, Cameron, Ahmavaara, Arnold, & Samson, 2007).
Research on adults also suggests that they are motivated to control intergroup bias due to specific egalitarian social
norms (e.g., Monteith, Deenan, & Tooman, 1996; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Lowery,
Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001; Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2003; Dasgupta & Rivera, 2006). Further, recent research suggests that
children’s understanding of these social norms requires cognitive effort, in particular the ability to understand other
people’s mental states, attitudes or beliefs about social relationships (Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2009; Abrams
& Rutland, 2008; Banerjee, 2000). Together this research suggests that social norms and second order mental state
understanding may also moderate children’s control of their ethnic intergroup bias. To test this proposition we conducted a
second study.
Study 2
In Study 2 we vary public accountability as we did in Study 1, and we anticipate that children’s control of their ethnic
intergroup bias when held publically accountable will be moderated by their understanding and awareness of the in-group
norm about showing intergroup bias. This is because once children understand the in-group social norm they can
strategically present the self as acting in accordancewith this norm, so giving a positive impression of themselves to the in-
group.
Developmental psychologists have recently begun to demonstrate that group norms affect young children’s explicit
ethnic intergroup attitudes (Apfelbaum, Pauker, Ambady, Sommers, &Norton, 2008; Nesdale, Durkin,Maass, & Griffiths,
2005; Rutland, 2004; Rutland et al., 2005; Rutland et al., 2007). For example, Nesdale et al. (2005) found that 7-year-old
children only showed explicit ethnic prejudice when either a pro-prejudice norm and/or an out-group threat was made
salient. Nesdale and colleagues also found older 9-year-old children showed evidence of ethnic prejudice control, except
when both an in-group pro-prejudice norm and out-group threat was present. Similarly, Rutland et al. (Study 1, 2005)
found that 5–16-year-oldWhite British children highly aware of the social norm against expressing explicit racism showed
low explicit ethnic prejudice. In contrast, children with little awareness of this norm only inhibited their prejudicewhen the
norm was made salient by increasing their accountability.
We expect children who have a strong awareness that their in-group typically shows low ethnic intergroup bias (i.e.,
hold an anti-prejudice norm) are mostly likely to inhibit their explicit ethnic intergroup bias under high public
accountability. It is possible that children may think their in-group typically shows high intergroup bias (i.e., hold a pro-
prejudice norm) and in this case wewould not expect children to show any evidence of bias control. Arguably the presence
of a pro-prejudice norm is less likely in the domain of ethnic intergroup attitudes because research suggests in western
societies amongst most ethnic majority people there is a clear and strong social norm about showing explicit positivity
towards the Black ethnic minority out-group (see Crandall et al., 2002; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Zitek &Helb, 2007). In
contrast, research suggests that children often perceive pro-prejudice norms in the domain of national intergroup bias (e.g.,
Rutland, 1999; Bennett et al., 2004; Abrams et al., 2009).
However, the control of explicit intergroup bias by attending to an in-group anti-prejudice norm is also likely to involve
recursive reasoning about mental states, since the child is concerned about the way he or she is seen in the mind of others.
This ability initially involves what developmental psychologists call ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM), namely the capacity to
impute mental states or understand what others think and believe (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Developmental
psychologists have typically measured ToM using what are known as ‘false belief’ tasks which reveal whether children
understand that it is possible to hold beliefs that are different from reality (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Essentially in this
task a child is privy to some crucial information that another child does not have and they are judged to hold ToM if they
realize the other child will behave consistent with their lack of information rather with the information held by the child.
Developmental research (e.g., Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994) shows children from 5 years of age engage
in recursive mental state reasoning about false beliefs (i.e., understand that one person may have a false belief about
another person’s belief). This second-order false belief understanding is known to develop well into middle childhood
(Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999). From around 6–7 years of age children can understand false
beliefs about social, not just physical, stimuli (e.g., Nguyen & Frye, 1999; Symons,McLaughlin, Moore, &Morine, 1997),
and begin to understand about false emotions as well as false beliefs (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke, 1989).
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In the present study we measured children’s second-order mental state understanding using a measure of Theory of
Social Mind (ToSM) first developed by Abrams et al. (2009). This task was selected because we were concerned with
children’s inferences about the expression of liking or disliking. The ToSM task tests children’s ability to distinguish their
own feelings about a character from the feelings of a peer who does not share the same information about that character.
This requires an ability to use information about the prior social relationship between two peers to make an inference about
their feelings towards one another, independently of the child’s own knowledge and feelings about that peer. The ToSM
task is based in the interpersonal domain, allowing us to be confident that it does not simply measure children’s learning of
a particular social norm for a specific group.
Further, Abrams et al. (2009) found that children’s understanding of group dynamics and norms (i.e., who will be
accepted and rejected by the group) was associated with the development of ToSM. Children with high ToSMwere able to
use this understanding to inform their exclusion judgments of individual group members. This finding suggests that ToSM
may be important to children’s ability to understand group norms about showing explicit bias and their control of explicit
intergroup bias (Rutland, 2004; Rutland et al., 2005; Apfelbaum et al., 2008).
Research suggests that children begin to show second-order mental state understanding involving false emotions
(Harris et al., 1989) and liking in social relationships (Abrams et al., 2009) from approximately 6–7 years of age. This is
why 6–9-year-old children, who should already show some ToSM ability, were examined within the Study 2. However,
unlike in Study 1, the age was used as a continuous variable since the developmental literature has not identified any major
shift in children’s ToSM ability beyond 6–7 years of age.
In Study 2, we expect children will only control their ethnic intergroup bias when they are aware that their in-group
holds an anti-prejudice norm. Furthermore we anticipate that children’s ToSM will moderate whether they act in
accordance with this in-group norm when held publically accountable to the in-group. Children high in ToSM should
readily perceive the anti-prejudice norm even under minimal public accountability (i.e., when only the in-group
experimenter is present) and, therefore, show low intergroup bias in both the low and high public accountability
conditions. In contrast, we expect children with low ToSMwill significantly decrease their intergroup bias between the low




236White British children (123 males, 113 females) aged between 6–9 years (M¼ 7 years and 9months, SD¼ 12months)
were selected from ethnically heterogeneous elementary schools in a predominantly White middle-class suburb outside a
large metropolitan city in the southeast region of England. According to the Commission for Racial Equality (2006), only
8.5% of the schools population in this area was from an ethnic minority and all teachers in the schools were White British.
Procedure
Children were tested individually in their schools after parental/guardian consent was obtained. They first completed in a
counter balanced order the ToSM measure (Abrams et al., 2009) and a measure of the children awareness of the in-group
norm about showing intergroup bias. Following this, as in Study 1, the children completed an explicit ethnic intergroup
bias measure (Aboud, 2003; Doyle & Aboud, 1995) under either low or high public accountability. Assignment to the low
or high public accountability condition was random in each age group. Public accountability was manipulated using a
same technique to that in Study 1. This created a high public accountability condition (n¼ 120, 50.8%) and a low public
accountability condition (n¼ 116, 49.2%).
Measures
Explicit ethnic attitudes. TheMRA (Aboud, 2003; Doyle &Aboud, 1995) was used as a measure of intergroup attitudes, as
in Study 1 and was scored in the same way as described in Study 1.
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Theory of Social Mind (ToSM)
The ToSM task (Abrams et al., 2009) required children to understand a ‘‘false evaluation’’ of another character. The task
has a social focus, requiring understanding of how a first character will feel towards a second character who has secretly
stolen the first character’s toys. To answer correctly children must dissociate their own evaluation of the thief from the
evaluation held by the first character. They have to understand the mental state of the first character and accurately assess
this character’s evaluation of thief. This social situation provides a parallel context to the social cognitive demands
children may face when making social judgments about group behavior, such as how other in-group members would feel
towards an out-group.
Children were told, ‘‘Jack and Chris have just met for the first time. Jack is playing a gamewith Chris. Jack is having fun
and is enjoying playing the game a lot. Then Jack leaves the room to get a drink. While Jack is gone, Chris steals some of
Jack’s toys. Jack comes back after Chris has hidden the toys in his pocket.’’ This story was told with illustrative pictures to
aid understanding and to keep the children’s attention. Children were then asked, ‘‘Do you think Jack likes Chris?’’, and
‘‘Why/why not?’’ Children should state that Jack likes Chris because Jack did not know about the theft.
Responses were scored according to both the judgment of whether Jack would like Chris or not, and also whether the
explanation indicated that the child understood that Jack was unaware Chris had stolen the toys. A score of zero was
assigned to incorrect answers (‘‘no’’) including any with the explanation that Jack would not like Chris because Chris
stole/is a thief. A score of 1 was assigned to correct answers, (‘‘yes’’) but with a limited explanation (e.g., ‘‘because he
plays with Chris’’). A score of 2 was assigned to correct ‘‘yes’’ answers that included an accurate explanation (e.g.,
‘‘because he thinks Chris is nice’’, or ‘‘because he doesn’t know Chris took the toys’’). A higher score indicated more
advanced ToSM.
Awareness of In-group Norm
In contrast to previous studies (e.g., Rutland et al., 2005) which have assessed children’s personal norms about showing
intergroup bias, in this study we examined their awareness of social norms about showing prejudice held by their in-group.
Children were presented with a pictorial ambiguous money scenario from the Ambiguous Situations Task (McGothlin,
Killen, & Edmonds, 2005; McGothlin & Killen, 2006). In this money situation picture, two children (one White and one
Black) are standing outside on a playground. The White child has her/his pockets pulled out with a distressed expression
on his face. A £5 note is on the ground behind him. The Black child is bending down picking up the £5 note. Children were
first presented with this picture (N.B. boys received a picture with boys as characters and girls were given a picture with
girls as characters) then asked to imagine that another white child or white teacher in their class had seen the picture. Then
they were presented with 12 different statements that could be said about this picture (six positive and six negative). The
six positive statements were: ‘The Black child is picking up the money to give it back to theWhite child’; ‘The Black child
has seen the money but won’t steal it’; ‘The Black child can’t have stolen the money as he/she is not nasty’; ‘The Black
child is being helpful’; ‘The Black child is kind sowill give the money back to theWhite child’; ‘The Black child is not bad
so will give the money back’. The six negative statements were: ‘The Black child has seen the money and will steal it’;
‘The Black child stole the money because he/she is nasty’; ‘The Black child is a thief’; ‘The Black child is picking up the
money as he/she will steal it’; ‘The Black child is not being helpful as he/she will take the money and keep it’; ‘The Black
child is bad so will not give the money back’.
Children were then asked to rate how many children and teachers in their class would say the each of the above
statements if they saw the picture. A series of response scales was presented, showing proportionate numbers of stick
people with labels representing almost all the children/teachers, most of the children/teachers, about half of the children/
teachers, a few of the children/teachers, and none of the children/teachers. This was later scored as a scale from 0 (none) to
4 (almost all). Children’s answers for the six positive statement were reversed scored and combined with responses for the
six negative statements, so a higher score (above 2) indicated the children thought their in-group would show ethnic bias
towards the out-group (i.e., pro-prejudice norm) and lower score (below 2 meant the children perceived their in-group
wouldn’t show bias towards the ethnic out-group (i.e., anti-prejudice norm). Analyses revealed the 12 items had good
reliability (a¼ .85), so all items were retained for analysis and averaged to give a total prejudice norm score.
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Results and Discussion
The correlations between all variables are shown in Table 3. Analysis of children’s intergroup bias was conducted using
multiple regression with Age (in months), ToSM score, Prejudice norm score as continuous predictors and Public
accountability (dummy coded as high or low) as a binary predictor. To test our hypotheses, procedures recommended by
Aiken andWest (1991) were followed. We first centered age, ToSM score, Prejudice norm score and Public accountability
and computed their two, three, and four way interactions which were then entered hierarchically as predictors of
intergroup bias.
Overall the regression model significantly predicted the children’s intergroup bias, R2¼ .11, F(14, 235)¼ 1.76, p< .05.
Age was a significant predictor of intergroup bias (b¼.24, t¼3.58, p< .01), indicating that as age increased
intergroup bias decreased. As expected, there was also a significant three-way Prejudice norm Public
accountabilityToSM interaction (b¼.14, t¼1.97, p< .05). A simple slopes analysis revealed that public
accountability had a significant effect on intergroup bias for low ToSM (t¼2.72, p< .01) children but not high ToSM
(t¼ 0.36, p> .05) children, only when they thought their in-group held an anti-prejudice norm (see Figure 2a, b). In these
Figures the effects for ToSM are represented by values þ/1 standard deviation from the mean.
In line with our prediction, only children with low ToSM scores who thought their in-group wouldn’t discriminate
against the out-group significantly decreased their intergroup bias when public accountability increased. In contrast,
children with high ToSM scores who were aware their in-group held an anti-prejudice norm (children with low scores on
the norm task) showed low intergroup bias irrespective of the public accountability manipulation. The intergroup attitudes
of children who thought their in-group held a pro-prejudice norm (children with low scores on the norm task) were as
predicted unaffected by our public accountability manipulation.
Study 2 makes an original contribution by revealing that ToSM and children’s awareness of the in-group norm together
moderate children’s control of their ethnic intergroup bias when held publically accountable to the in-group. These
findings go beyond previous research showing that children control their prejudice (Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Nesdale,
2004; Rutland, 2004; Rutland et al., 2005) by highlighting how social-cognitive and normative processes combine during
the process of prejudice control in childhood.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Together the two studies described in this paper tell us about the ‘something’ Allport (1954) said is required for children to
control their intergroup bias. They suggest that both the development of social emotions (e.g., embarrassment) and ToSM
in combination with children’s awareness of in-group norm moderate how children inhibit their intergroup bias when held
accountable to the in-group. Our studies support the notion that children’s intergroup bias may decline due to children’s
increasing ability to control their bias when made publically accountable to the in-group (e.g., Abrams et al., 2007;
Monteiro et al., 2009; Rutland, 1999, 2004; Rutland et al., 2005). Moreover they make a novel contribution by showing for
the first time amongst children affective and social-cognitive factors that influence how they learn to control their explicit
ethnic intergroup bias.
Table 3. Correlations, means, and standard deviations for age, ToSM, norm, and explicit intergroup bias
1 2 3 4
1. Age —
2. ToSM .21 —
3. Norm .07 .03 —
4. Intergroup bias .22 .03 .03
5. Means 7.33 1.10 1.56 0.056
6. SDs 1.02 0.71 0.87 2.62
p< .01.
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Further the finding that both social emotions and ToSM act in similar ways in the process of inhibiting intergroup bias
under in-group accountability, with children low in these abilities suppressed their intergroup bias when made accountable
to the in-group suggests that the two factors are interrelated. Indeed previous developmental research has suggested that
the attribution of social emotions such as embarrassment is associated with recursive cognitions about other’s mental states
and second-order mental state understanding (e.g., Banerjee 2002b; Bennett & Matthews, 2000). Our studies suggest a
child’s developing capacity to understand their social emotions and beliefs, and they how might be different or the same as
other’s social emotions and beliefs is important if they are to control their intergroup attitudes. This type of recursive
reasoning about emotions and mental states in intergroup contexts arguably offer the child the potential to frame their
intergroup attitudes to create a positive image amongst their in-group (i.e., engage in self-presentation).
However, our findings suggest that such recursive social reasoning may not always result in low explicit intergroup bias
since self-regulation of bias also appears to be depend on the specific social norms children perceive to be held by the in-
group to which they are accountable. In Study 2 children who perceived a pro-prejudice in-group norm showed no
Figure 2. (a) The effect of public accountability on high ToSM and low ToSM children’s intergroup bias when they understand their
in-group holds an anti-prejudice norm. (b) The effect of public accountability on high and low ToSM children’s intergroup bias when
they understand their in-group holds a pro-prejudice norm. Note: 1p> .05 2p< .01
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evidence of decreased ethnic bias under in-group accountability. Pro-prejudice in-group norms regarding national
intergroup bias have been found before in studies with white European children in either the UK (e.g., Abrams, Rutland,
Cameron, & Marques, 2003; Abrams et al., 2009; Rutland, 1999) or the Netherlands (e.g., Verkuyten, 2001). Indeed, in
line with our argument, Rutland et al. (2005—Study 2) found that 10–12-year-old white British children increased their
national intergroup bias when an in-group pro-bias norm was made salient by increasing their in-group accountability. A
recent study by Abrams et al. (2007) also showed that above 7 years children’s social exclusion of individuals who
challenged the validity of the in-group within a relatively minimal group context increased when they were made
accountable to the in-group. These studies show that self-regulation can also operate to facilitate intergroup bias in the
domain of nationality and minimal groups where arguably different social norms about showing explicit intergroup exist.
An alternative account of our findings with children scoring high on the social emotions and ToSM tasks may simply be
that these children are more empathic towards the out-group since previous research has shown that enhancing children’s
empathy is associated with lower explicit intergroup bias (Aboud & Levy, 2000; Feshbach & Feshbach, 1998). Future
research could address this point directly by measuring children’s empathy (see Nesdale, Griffiths, Durkin, & Maass,
2005). The use of an implicit measure of ethnic intergroup bias alongside an explicit measure within our experimental
paradigm might also clarify whether children with high social emotions and ToSM are controlling their explicit bias.
Nonetheless the findings of Rutland et al. (2005; Study 1) suggest that older children (i.e., 10 years and above), who should
show high social emotions and ToSM, are indeed controlling their explicit attitudes under in-group accountability because
they continue to show implicit ethnic bias despite showing less explicit ethnic bias.
However, empathy cannot explain why children with little propensity to show social emotions or ToSM significantly
decreased their intergroup bias when made highly accountable to the in-group. A manipulation making children
accountable to the out-group may have increased these children’s empathy for the out-group and so decreased intergroup
bias, but it seems unlikely this occurred with our in-group accountability manipulation. Instead our findings relating to the
children with little social emotions or ToSM suggests their decreased intergroup bias results from being held highly
accountable to the in-group which most likely holds a moral norm that one should be empathic and less biased towards the
ethnic out-group. These children, unlike the high social emotions and ToSM children, required increased public in-group
accountability before they appreciated how the in-group felt towards the out-group and only then showed lower intergroup bias.
A potential limitation of our research was the use of the extended identity task to measure social emotions in Study 1
since it included a question that asked children to judge the feelings of a toddler they had in their care. Developmental
research has shown that children as young as 2-year-old are not capable of feeling social emotion like embarrassment or
guilt (e.g., Bennett, 1989). It is possible though debatable whether our 5–11-year-old participants were aware of these
emotional limitations of toddlers. Nonetheless if the children inferred the toddler was feeling social emotion they could
arguably be engaging in egocentric attribution. The inclusion of an older friend in the faux pas story might have addressed
this issue, but then it would have been difficult to make the child feel a sense of responsibility for the child. Indeed we
deliberately created a context of having the child taking care of a younger friend when committing a faux pas because it
accentuated the potential for social emotions in the situation. Future research should aim to measure children’s attributions
of social emotions when they commit a faux pas in a context involving an older friend while maintaining a sense of
responsibility for this friend.
Another factor to consider in future research is children’s motivation to comply with social norms that condemn explicit
ethnic intergroup bias even though they may have the capacity to show high attribution of social emotions and ToSM. For
instance, how much children identify with their group may also affect their motivation to control explicit intergroup bias.
Children with high group identification may show greater attention to the norm held by their group (Abrams & Rutland,
2008; Abrams et al., 2003) and subsequently be more likely to self-regulate their attitudes and if their group norm is to
reject discrimination then they should control their intergroup bias.
In the majority of societies now explicit ethnic intergroup bias is rare (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000) and most adults, and
we would suggest children too, are able and motivated to control their intergroup bias (Plant & Devine, 1998). Recent
research, however, suggests that ethnic majority children still show implicit ethnic bias (e.g., Baron & Banaji, 2006;
Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2006; Rutland et al., 2005), so future research should also examine how we might reduce
children’s implicit ethnic bias. Previous research has shown that amongst ethnic majority status children extended contact
with other ethnic groups (i.e., vicarious friendships) is associated with lower implicit ethic bias (Turner, Voci, &
Heswstone, 2007). Future research should examine causality within this relationship (i.e., do children who have less
implicit bias seek out contact or does contact cause less bias in the first place?).
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To conclude, our studies suggest that the ability to attribute social emotions together with the interactive effect of
children’s knowledge of in-group norms and ‘‘ToSM’’ moderate how children control their ethnic intergroup bias when
held accountable to the in-group. Overall both studies extend previous research which has shown children self-regulate
their intergroup attitudes when held publically accountable and demonstrate that factors know to facilitate intergroup bias
control in adults begin to emerge in early childhood. If we are to encourage people, as Allport suggests, to ‘put the brakes
on’ prejudice our findings suggest we need early interventions aimed at promoting children’s attribution of social emotions
(e.g., embarrassment), social-cognitive ability to understand other’s mental states and wider anti-prejudice in-group norms
within society.
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